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Abstract
Does Thomistic Natural Law theory commit the naturalistic fallacy? Ralph McInerny
seems to think that Thomistic Natural Law, as Thomas Aquinas himself articulates it,
escapes any potentially defeating criticism derived from the Naturalistic fallacy as
described most notably by G. E. Moore and David Hume, which states that morality is
not derivable from any natural property. The naturalistic fallacy, if successful in its
purpose, deals a fatal blow to the school of moral philosophy that strives to adhere to
traditional Thomism. In response to the criticism rooted in the Naturalistic fallacy,
scholars like John Finnis insist that Thomistic Natural Law must, at the very least,
undergo a re-articulation to answer this challenge. Their theory, new Natural Law
Theory, subtly, but significantly departs from Thomism by replacing the telos with a
deontological ethic. Thomistic Natural Law, traditionally understood, has much to offer
contemporary philosophy in its own right—independent of newer, similar theories, and
does not need any major revision to answer the challenge posed by either version of the
naturalistic fallacy.
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The Thomistic Conception of Natural Law:
Does It Commit the Naturalistic Fallacy?
In the history of Western civilization the concept of Natural Law has permeated
the writings of political scientists and philosophers alike. Natural Law theory as
conceptualized by Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) most accurately accounts for the manner
in which man moralizes and in turn formulates positive law, by insisting that ethics are
necessary for the formation of a legal system.1 Natural Law as understood by Classical
Realism is intuitive and universal—everyone everywhere recognizes it. Thomas Aquinas
asserted that Natural Law is accessible to everyone through the exercise of human reason.
He also understood positive law as a manifestation of the Natural Law which itself
extends from the nature of God; it is imprinted onto the ordered structure of the cosmos
and accessible to rational man either through introspection or through observation of the
order, logic, and morality of the universe. As a rational creature, man is capable of
ascertaining what constitutes an ethical way of life. Aquinas argues that, since human
beings are by nature rational beings, it is morally appropriate that they should behave in a
way that conforms to their rational nature. 2 From this Aquinas derives his concept of
moral law as formulated from the nature of human beings.3
One of the most challenging criticisms leveled at Natural Law theory as a whole,
and ostensibly most devastating to Thomistic Natural Law theory, the naturalistic fallacy

1

John Finnis. Aquinas: Moral, Political, and Legal Theory (Founders of Modern Political and
Social Thought). (New York: Oxford University Press, USA, 1999), 3.
2
Frederick C. Copleston, Aquinas, Pelican philosophy series. (Harmondsworth, Middlesex:
Penguin Books, 1955), 223.
3
Thomas Aquinas, Saint Thomas Aquinas Aquinas, the Treatise On Law: [being Summa
Theologiae, I-II; QQ. 90 through 97], trans. R J. Henle (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press,
1993), 160.
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as formulated by G. E. Moore in his seminal book, Principia Ethica.4 Moore’s
naturalistic fallacy is closely related, but not identical to David Hume’s earlier
formulation. Scholarly use of the locution “naturalistic fallacy” often fails to convey
clearly a univocal meaning. The phrase can refer to either a theory proposed by Hume
(also denoted as the Is-Ought Problem), or a related (but not identical) one presented by
G.E. Moore in Principia Ethica. Conventional scholarly usage, such as that of Antony
Flew’s also seems to allow for the conflation of the Humean and Moorean versions.5
Clarification of Terms
The confusion created by the indeterminate meaning of “naturalistic fallacy”
requires clarification. When critics of Natural Law theory accuse Aquinas of committing
the naturalistic fallacy it is difficult to determine which fallacy or what combination of
fallacies is referenced. In this thesis, a special effort will be made to elucidate the
meaning of an author’s reference to the naturalistic fallacy. Moore’s version will be
referred to as the Definist fallacy, and Hume’s as the Is-Ought Problem.
Both the Humean version and Moore’s Definist fallacy served as catalysts,
prompting John Finnis and Germaine Grizes, to rehabilitate Thomistic Natural Law
theory by creating the New Natural Law theory.6 Other more traditional Thomists like
Russell Hittinger, Alasdair MacIntyre, Ralph McInerny, Henry Veach, and Anthony
Lisska attempt to counter the criticisms of Hume, Moore, or both to maintain the validity
and relevance of Thomistic Natural theory. Both the New Natural Law theorists and the
more traditional Thomists agree that contemporary philosophy has, as a general rule, too
4

G. E. Moore, and G. Scott Davis, Principia Ethica. (New York: Barnes & Noble Books, 2005),

43-44.
5

Antony Flew, A Dictionary of Philosophy (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1979), 240-41.
Joseph Boyle, “Natural Law and the Ethics of Tradition” in Natural Law Theory, ed. Robert P.
George (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 7.
6
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hastily dismissed Thomistic Natural Law theory for other theories of Natural Law, or
even legal positivism.
Different Natural Law Solutions
The more traditional Thomists disagree with Finnis and the New Natural Law
theorists regarding how Aquinas’s Treatise on Law ought to be interpreted. The New
Natural Law theorists insist that either one or both of the articulations of the naturalistic
fallacy are devastating for Thomistic Natural Law (traditionally understood). The more
traditional Thomists adamantly adhere to the traditional understanding of Thomistic
Natural Law theory. Both schools of thought insist that their interpretation most
faithfully translates Thomistic Natural Law Theory into an analytic or contemporary
philosophical context.
Thomistic Moral Theory
Thomas Aquinas merged what he considered to be the best element of Stoic
ethics, namely their conception of the cosmic logos—the guiding, logical, natural order in
the world—with the Aristotelian notion of the final telos or purposeful end of every
object.7 He thought that a theory of Natural Law which combined these two elements,
could most accurately account for both the natural state of man and the rational ethic man
ought to follow.8 In other words the Thomistic ethic is both eudaimonistic and
teleological.9

7

A G. Sertillanges, The Intellectual Life: Its Spirit, Conditions, Methods, A Newman paperback
(Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, 1959), 23.
8
Louis P. Pojman, Ethics: Discovering Right and Wrong, 5 ed. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth
Publishing, 2005), 45-46.
9
Frederick Copleston, Medieval Philosophy From Augustine to Duns Scotus, New edition ed., vol.
2 of A History of Philosophy (New York: Image, 1993), 398.
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The Overlap Thesis

Natural Law theory accepts that law can be spoken of in both a factual sense of
actual social power and practice and as a set of ethical reasons for an action. Legal
positivism as a Natural Law theory criticizes what it perceives as an unfounded synthesis
of two distinct understandings of Natural Law—descriptive and ethical. Natural Law
theorists attempt to incorporate both of these into one cohesive system. So within this
basic understanding of Natural Law there is an important distinction to make between
two theories: Natural Law moral theory and Natural Law legal theory. Thomas Aquinas
argues that the discussion and study of Natural Law theory belongs simultaneously in two
areas of philosophy, advocating an overlapping system that bases positive law on the
foundation of ethics.
The Summum Bonum
One of the most important phrases in the moral philosophy of Thomas Aquinas is
in this famous dictum. “[B]onum est faciendum et prosequendum, et malum
vitandum.”10 That is, “good is to be done and pursued, and evil avoided.”11 A proper
understanding of what Thomas means by the term “good” provides the key to discovering
how Thomistic moral philosophy ought to be understood. The Summum Bonum, the
Highest Good, God Himself, informs all of Thomistic thought. If human happiness
consists in theoria, in contemplation of the “highest and noblest object,” then happiness
lies intrinsically in contemplating God, Himself.12 Goodness, for Thomas Aquinas has its
locus in the very nature of God.

10

Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae. Corpus Thomisticum,
http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/sth2094.html (accessed February 1, 2011). I-II 94.2 Respondeo
11
Translation my own.
12
Copleston, Medieval Philosophy From Augustine to Duns Scotus, 398.
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Though this might seem too explicitly religious a basis for an ethical (and by
extension) Natural Law theory, one must keep in mind that God as the Summum Bonum
is the focal point for all of Aquinas’s writings. Any attempt to interpret the vast body of
his work apart from an awareness of the most essential scaffolding upon which he forms
and hangs his complex philosophy, does him a great disservice. A thorough
understanding of Thomistic moral theology and by extension Natural Law depends first
upon a fair and accurate understanding of what Thomas Aquinas taught and wrote.
Further criticism of fundamental Thomistic assertions remains within the realm of
external retrospection, and as such extraneous to the present concern of understanding
Thomistic philosophy on its own.
Thomistic Vocabulary
The section of the Treatise on Law that most pertains to the question at hand is
Question 94: “Concerning the Natural Law.” In the first Article of this question Aquinas
describes the teleology that provides the basis for his Natural Law system, while also
elucidating the manner by which the intellect comes to recognize Natural Law. This
Question will provide the majority of material for exegesis:
For it is said, that everything to which a man is inclined by his nature
pertains to the Natural Law. Now, each thing is inclined naturally to an
operation which is suitable to it in accord with its form, thus fire is
inclined to give heat. For this reason, since the rational soul is the proper
form of man, there is in every man a natural inclination to act according
to reason…. Therefore this is the first precept of the law; that which is
good is to be done and pursued, and evil avoided. Upon this principle all
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other precepts of the law are based: so all the things that Practical
Reason apprehends as man’s good, pertains to the precepts of Natural
Law.13
This excerpt from the Summa Theologiae is drawn from perhaps the most
important passage in the Treatise of Law and provides the context for discerning the
proper interpretation of Aquinas’s Natural Law theory. Any attempt to evaluate
Thomistic Natural Law requires a careful placement of this Natural Law theory in the
greater context of Thomistic moral philosophy.14 The entire body of Aquinas’s moral
thought provides the necessary foundation for any exegetical insights into the Treatise on
Law.
Speculative and Practical Reason
All men have the same, basic rational capacities, so it would seem that the Natural
Law would manifest itself in the same manner to everyone. Aquinas argues in Question
94, Article 4 that the Natural Law is universally accessible to everyone. He uses his
careful distinction between speculative and practical reason as his means for elaborating
how the Natural Law can at once be universally the same, and express itself differently in
particular situations.15
Speculative reason is engaged with “necessary things, which cannot be
otherwise.” 16 Practical reason, however is preoccupied with contingent matters, and
“therefore, though there is some necessity in the universal principles, the more we

13

This translation is my own. (Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae. Corpus Thomisticum,
http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/sth2094.html (accessed February 1, 2011). Treatise on Law Q 94.)
14
John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Clarendon Law Series) (New York: Oxford
University Press, USA, 1980), 398.
15
Aquinas, trans. R J. Henle Saint Thomas Aquinas Aquinas, the Treatise On Law, 260.
16
Ibid, 261.
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descend to matters of detail, the more frequently we encounter defects.”17 In matters of
action, which Natural Law encompasses, “Truth and or practical rectitude is not the same
for all, as to matters of detail, but only as to general principles....”18 Neither is “truth or
rectitude” the same for all nor, where it is the same, is it equally known by all.19
Speculative reason concerns itself with obtaining knowledge to understand and
explain reality, in the manner of syllogisms, definitions, and judgments. The first
principles of speculative reason are self-evident, indemonstrable principles (i.e. “Being
is;” the law of non-contradiction). Practical reason governs knowledge which pertains to
action, and carrying out the “good” requires the cooperation of the will, and begins with
the end, the telos. The first principles of practical reason are analogous to the first
principles of speculative reason. So the speculative principle: “something cannot both
exist and not exist in the same place in the same way” is analogous to the synderesis rule,
“good is to be done and pursued and evil avoided.”20
Aquinas offers an example of a situation where a general principle seems to be
contradicted. He refers to the general principle that anything that is borrowed should be
returned to its original owner. “This is true for the majority of cases: it may happen,
however, in a particular case that it would be harmful, and therefore, unreasonable, to
restore goods held in trust.”21 He then provides a specific instance in which it would be
wrong to restore borrowed property to its original owner: “For instance if they are
claimed for the purpose for fighting against one's country.”22 The Natural Law, then, can

17

Ibid, 260-261.
Ibid, 261.
19
Ibid.
20
Ibid, 248.
21
Ibid.
22
Ibid.
18
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manifest itself rather differently in particular circumstances. Therefore, particular
differences merely suggest that as one is further removed from the basic principles
legitimate differences in opinion emerge, and emerge with greater frequency.
Aquinas asks Question 94, Article 5: “Whether the Law of Nature Can Be
Changed?”23 He answers that “with regard to the first principles of Natural Law, the
Natural Law is altogether unchangeable,” yet regarding the “secondary principles” or
particular circumstances, the Natural Law remains unchanged, but can manifest itself in
different ways.24 In addition, Natural Law may be augmented “for the benefit of human
life” and is supplemented “both by the Divine law and by human laws.”25 In other words,
the Natural Law can be supplemented as far as dictating the proper course of action for a
particular case, but this does not entail a “change” of the law.
Aquinas is forced, however, to explain some difficult events in Scripture, as when
God commanded Abraham to slay Isaac or the prophet Hosea to take a “wife of
fornication.”26 Or even more problematically, the genocidal decrees God makes to the
Israelites. How does Aquinas explain? “By the command of God, death can be imposed
on any man, guilty or innocent, without any injustice whatsoever.”27 Nevertheless,
Aquinas is not asserting that these exceptional cases are not additions to the Natural Law,
but that as additions they do not change the law.
Precepts
Aquinas asserts that Natural Law has basic, guiding precepts by which the Natural
Law is discovered by the human intellect. In other words, just as certain “principles” of
23

Ibid, 268.
Ibid, 269
25
Aquinas, Summa Theologiae. I-II Q. 94. A. 5.
26
Aquinas, trans. R J. Henle Saint Thomas Aquinas Aquinas, the Treatise On Law, 268.
27
Ibid, 269.
24
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speculative reason exist similar to the law of non-contradiction, in the same way
principles of Natural Law exist. These principles are self-evident, in one of two ways:
either they are “self-evident in themselves” or they are “self-evident to different
people.”28 The three most basic principles of Natural Law are as follows:
I. Good is to be done and pursued, and evil avoided.29
II. The procreation and the education of offspring ought to be pursued.30
III. Humans goods are those goods to which humans have natural inclinations (i.e.
to “know the truth about God” and the achievement of societal harmony).31
Different Kinds of Law
Aquinas distinguishes between four different types of law which necessitate his
use of the word “law” analogously between the distinct definitions.32 Many of the
misunderstandings of his theory originate from an improper characterization of his use of
the word “law” as univocal rather than analogical. The strength of Thomistic Natural
Law theory lies in the careful distinctions between Eternal Law, Natural Law, Human
Law, and Divine Law.
Eternal Law
The first type of law that Aquinas addresses is eternal law. Eternal Law is the
ideal order and design of the universe in the mind of God—“The very Idea of the
government of things in God the Ruler of the universe.”33 There are two sides to this
Thomistic conception of eternal law. In one sense this law is transcendent, utterly

28

Ibid, 245.
Aquinas, Summa Theologiae. I-II Q. 94. A. 2.
30
Ibid.
31
Ibid.
32
Aquinas, trans. R J. Henle Saint Thomas Aquinas Aquinas, the Treatise On Law, 149.
33
Ibid, 154.
29
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ineffable and integrated within the mysterious divine nature. In another sense Eternal
Law is immanent and accessible as it permeates the entire universe—it is the basic,
orderly structure of the cosmos.
Natural Law
The second type of law, Natural Law, is observed in the human inclination to do
good and avoid evil. “It is evident that all things partake somewhat of the eternal law, in
so far as, namely, from its being imprinted on them....Wherefore [human nature] has a
share of the Eternal Reason, whereby it has a natural inclination to its proper act and end:
and this participation of the eternal law in the rational creature is called the Natural
Law.”34 Natural Law enables humans to participate in the Eternal law—it is the
universal, human, moral impulse.
Human Law
The third type of law that Thomas Aquinas introduces is Human Law. Human
Law is essentially temporal law, or positive law—the application of Natural Law to legal
systems. Human Law is man-made and created by governments for the practical
organization and regulation of society. Traffic laws and courtroom regulations are
examples of Human Law. Aquinas argues that there is no Human Law in an ontological
sense—Human Law is a convention. However for conventional or positive law to be
just, it must be in agreement with Natural Law by logical extension and reflection.
Divine Law
The fourth type of law that Thomas Aquinas introduces is Divine Law, whose
jurisdiction specifically and exclusively entails special revelation.35 Divine Law includes

34
35

Ibid, 159-160.
Ibid, 166-167.
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those laws only accessible to men through Scriptures or Church Tradition, and consists of
a unique set of specific and direct divine commands. Divine Law is specifically needed
for four reasons:
I.

Man’s final and last end, his telos transcends the mere natural;36

II.

There is a need in any ethical system for dependable and accurate moral
principles;37

III.

God alone has the ability to judge one’s internal disposition and motive.38

IV.

“Human Law cannot punish or forbid all evils.”39

Interaction Among the Different Laws
In the Thomistic conception of these four laws, divine commands will always be
perfectly consistent with God’s nature which is revealed in the cosmos. The distinctions
and analogies that Aquinas offers between the four different types of law provide the
form and structure for his Natural Law theory. Natural Law functions as one aspect of
Aquinas’s conception of law. Thomistic Natural Law has to be understood within the
context of the greater system of which it is a small, but important part.
Criticisms of Natural Law Theory
One of the most challenging criticisms leveled at Natural Law theory as a whole,
and Thomistic Natural Law theory in particular, is the naturalistic fallacy as formulated
by G. E. Moore in his seminal book, Principia Ethica.40 Though chronologically later
than Hume’s Is-Ought Problem, Moore’s Definist Fallacy, could arguably function as the
more general fallacy of which the Is-Ought Problem is a specific instance. Hume’s
36

Ibid, 171.
Ibid.
38
Ibid.
39
Ibid.
40
Moore, and ed. G. Scott Davis. Principia Ethica, 43-44.
37
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iteration lodges a logical criticism against Natural Law theories, whereas Moore
constructs a strictly analytic, linguistic problem for Natural Law theorists.
David Hume’s Is-Ought Problem
David Hume describes the Is-Ought problem as a type of criticism against any
Naturalistic ethic.41 He illustrates what he sees as a logical fallacy inherent to it. He
asserts that nearly all of the preceding Naturalist ethicists have illicitly derived
prescriptive statements from descriptive statements.
In every system of morality which I have hitherto met with, I have always
remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of
reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations
concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surprised to find, that
instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with
no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This
change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as
this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, it is
necessary that it should be observed and explained; and at the same time
that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable,
how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely
different from it.42
Latent in this excerpt from Hume’s, A Treatise on Human Nature, is his assertion
that it is illogical to derive an “ought” from an “is,” a prescription from a description, a

41

The author uses the term “Naturalistic” to mean that Cognitivist, meta-ethical category, which
asserts that the “good” is derivable in at least some sense from natural properties.
42
David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (Oxford Philosophical Texts) (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, USA, 1740), 178.
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moral value from a fact. A simple, logical illustration will serve to elucidate Hume’s
meta-ethical point:
(1) a. Maria is in need of a 1300 on her GRE in order to get into her graduate
school of choice.
(2) a. Maria can get a 1300 on her GRE if she cheats.
Hume asks: Can we logically infer the following conclusion?
(3) a. Maria ought to cheat on her GRE.43
Or, more simply:
(1) b. Factual premise
(2) b. Factual premise
(3) b. Prescriptive conclusion
Hume insists that both these arguments are invalid as neither conclusion (3)a nor
conclusion (3)b can be logically inferred from premises (1)a and (1)b and (2)a and (2)b,
respectively. According to Hume, the reason that conclusion (3) is illicitly derived from
premises (1) and (2) is because this argument moves from a descriptive premise to a
prescriptive conclusion without a major prescriptive premise. Thus far Hume’s point
seems perfectly legitimate—he is merely stating a logical rule of inference. His essential
criticism focuses upon a lack of clarity in the philosophical writings he encountered. If
Hume’s Is-Ought Problem is merely a logical one wherein a premise is absent from an
argument, then Hume’s Is-Ought Problem allows for a fairly easy loophole for the

43

This paradigm for this illustrative argument is drawn from: (Pojman, Louis P. Ethics:
Discovering Right and Wrong. 5 ed. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing, 2005. pg. 209).
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Natural Law theorist.44 The only step necessary to resolve the logical problem Hume
presents, is to insert a major premise into the argument he criticizes.
(1) Maria is in need of a 1300 on her GRE in order to get into her graduate school
of choice.
(2) Maria can get a 1300 on the GRE if she cheats.
(3) Anyone who needs a 1300 on their GRE ought to cheat.
Therefore,
(4) Maria ought to cheat on her GRE.45
Hume criticizes any type of Naturalism which derives an “ought” from an “is.”
The appropriate response to this criticism, as demonstrated syllogistically, is merely to
assert that there is an implied “oughtness” in many factual statements. A simple insertion
of a prescriptive premise corrects the form and clarifies the meaning of the argument.
Prominent, contemporary Thomist, Ralph McInerny, in response to Hume, merely asserts
that there is value in the universe, and that factual information in many cases entails
evaluative information.46 In addition, prominent Virtue Ethicist and Aristotelian Philippa
Foot, seems to think that Hume is simply wrong when he asserts that factual statements
are utterly distinct from evaluative statements.47 Aquinas would respond similarly. He
would assert that the teleological nature of humanity and all of creation in itself,

44

“Naturalist” in the sense of the ethical school under the umbrella of the Cognitivists, and in
direct contrast to Non-Naturalism.
45
This paradigm for this illustrative argument is drawn from: Pojman, Louis P. Ethics:
Discovering Right and Wrong. 5 ed. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing, 2005. pg. 212.
46
Ralph M. McInerny. Ethica Thomistica: The Moral Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas Aquinas.
(Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1997), 48.
47
Philippa Foot Virtues and Vices: And Other Essays in Moral Philosophy. (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1981), 70.
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demonstrates that the prescriptive is often interwoven into the descriptive.48 If everything
has a specific purpose for which it is designed specifically, if the universe is inherently
charged with and undergirded by Divine order and structure, then creation on a trajectory
toward its telos entails an inherent moral standard written into the structure of the
universe.49 Applying this insight to the example cited above, if cheating is not in accord
with Maria's telos as a human being in a human society because it involves a) stealing
from her fellow test-takers, b) lying to her future administrators and employers, and c)
losing (at least temporarily) her fellowship with her Creator (which is the ultimate
purpose of her existence), then the act of cheating can be seen to be objectively contrary
to the law that is written in human nature.
Hume’s criticism of Naturalism, as a primarily logical one seems to attack the
lack of clarity in the writings of the Naturalist philosophers of his day. The Is-Ought
Problem as a logical critique of Naturalism, appears to criticize a very poor articulation of
such a theory.50 At the very most, Hume’s criticism is merely a counter-assertion to the
Naturalistic and Thomistic assertion that the universe is inherently eudaimonistic and
teleological. Moore’s naturalistic or Definist fallacy enlarges upon the debate that takes
place in the discursive space that exists between these two assertions.

48

Aquinas, Saint Thomas Aquinas Aquinas, the Treatise On Law: [being Summa Theologiae, I-II;
QQ. 90 through 97], trans. ed. R J. Henle, 63.
49
Janet Coleman, “MacIntyre and Aquinas” in After MacIntyre: Critical Perspectives On the
Work of Alasdair MacIntyre. Edited by Horton, John, and Susan Mendus, (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1994), 72.
50
McInerny, Ethica Thomistica: The Moral Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas Aquinas, 56.
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G.E. Moore’s Definist Fallacy

Moore’s attempt to do away with any naturalistic ethic, hinges on his argument
that the “good” cannot be defined—at least in naturalistic terms.51 “Whatever definition
be offered, it may be always asked, with significance, of the complex so defined, whether
it is itself good.”52 As an intuitionist Moore denies any natural basis for the “good,”
which is sui generis, simple, and unanalyzable.53
Moore’s Definist problem, the naturalistic fallacy, arises in any attempt to answer
the question “What is Good?” with a naturalistic answer. Commentator Arthur N. Prior
describes Moore’s Definist problem:
[The naturalistic fallacy works under] the assumption that because
some quality or combination of qualities invariably and necessarily
accompanies the quality of goodness, or is invariably and necessarily
accompanied by it, or both, this quality or combination of qualities is
identical with goodness. If, for example, it is believed that whatever is
pleasant is and must be good, or that whatever is good is and must be
pleasant, or both, it is committing the naturalistic fallacy to infer from this
that goodness and pleasantness are one and the same quality. The
naturalistic fallacy is the assumption that because the words 'good' and,
say, 'pleasant' necessarily describe the same objects, they must attribute
the same quality to them.54

51

D. F. Wright, “Diagnosing the Naturalistic Fallacy: Principia Ethica Revisited.” Southern
Journal of Philosophy. 1994 (32, no. 4: 465), 474.
52
Moore, and ed. G. Scott Davis, Principia Ethica. 67.
53
Anthony J. Lisska, Aquinas’s Theory of Natural Law: An Analytic Reconstruction. (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1996), 62.
54
Arthur Prior. Logic and the Basis of Ethics. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1949), 1.
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Prior summarizes Moore’s Definist fallacy accurately. This fallacy applies to the
relationship between those things denoted as “good” and the definition of the “good”
itself.55 According to Prior, Moore asserts that to commit the Definist fallacy is to
assume that the good is at all definable.56 Though there is some continued debate over
the definition and application of Moore’s articulation of the Definist fallacy, for present
purposes Prior’s definition seems to convey a sufficiently accurate explanation.
Moore’s argument begins with his suspicion that Utilitarianism (or any sort of
Naturalistic ethic) depends on a logical error. To this end he formulates the Open
Question Argument. This argument takes the form of modus tollens.
(1) If chocolate is the good, then the question “Is chocolate good?” is
meaningless.
(2) The question “Is chocolate good?” is not meaningless (i.e. it is an open
question).
(3) Therefore, chocolate is not (analytically speaking) equivalent to good.
Whereas: modus ponens
(1) a. If John is a bachelor, then the question, “Is John married?” is meaningless.
(2) a. John is a bachelor.
(3) a. Therefore, the question, “Is John married?” is meaningless.
(4) a. Therefore, “good” and “chocolate” do not have the same relationship that the
terms “bachelor” and “married” do.57
The Open Question Argument claims that any endeavor to define the term “good”
using some set of empirical, natural properties always forms an open question. Moore
55

McInerny. Ethica Thomistica: The Moral Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas Aquinas. 49.
Prior. Logic and the Basis of Ethics. 1.
57
Lisska. Aquinas’s Theory of Natural Law: An Analytic Reconstruction. 60.

56
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illustrates a counter-example by citing the description of a horse which can be described
and defined by its make-up of different natural properties (legs, tail, head, and hair).58
Moore concludes that moral properties cannot be equated to, made up of, or described as
parts of natural properties.
Anthony Lisska, after analyzing Moore’s Definist fallacy, notes the different
Natural Law theory criticisms of Moore and Hume. He mentions two different Natural
Law answers to the charge of the Definist fallacy. John Finnis, Joseph Boyle and
Germain Grisez formulate an almost Kantian Thomism, whereas Anthony Lisska, Ralph
McInerny, Henry Veatch, and (to a less precise degree) Alasdair MacIntyre attempt to
defend a more authentic or traditional Thomism.
The New Natural Law Response
In many ways New Natural Law Theorists agree with the traditional Thomists in
their interpretation of Thomistic Natural Law. A discussion of the differences in
interpretation and articulation of Thomistic Natural Law and the subsequent review of the
different reactions prompted by varying contemporary criticisms rooted in the naturalistic
fallacy help to illustrate the nuances in opinion among Natural Law theorists.
Response to Hume
The New Natural Law theorists argue that Thomistic Natural Law cannot
withstand the barrage of analytic criticism—at least in its traditionally understood form.
John Finnis, Germaine Grisez, and Joseph Boyle are the three most prominent New
Natural Law theorists.59 Finnis, in particular, superimposes a quasi-Kantian concept of
practical reason onto Thomistic Natural Law theory, insisting that basic human goods are
58
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self-evident.60 Finnis attempts to restructure Natural Law in order to account efectively
for two important concerns in the contemporary philosophical context. These two issues
are: Hume’s Is-Ought Problem, and the contemporary perspective on substance, or
essence.61
In fact, Finnis and Grisez have asserted in almost Kantian or Cartesian fashion
that Natural Law theories must eschew invalid deductions (i.e. the Humean Is-Ought).
They merely assert that traditional Thomism does fall prey to the Is-Ought Problem and
they modify Natural Law theory accordingly. “There can be no valid deduction of a
normative conclusion without a normative principle, and thus … first practical principles
cannot be derived from metaphysical speculations.”62 In other words, Finnis and Grisez
see no way to maintain a traditional conception of ontology in Aquinas’s writings, which
ties into Finnis’s second area of concern: “a modern view of essence or substance.”63
Self-Evidence
The New Natural Law theorists insist that Thomism as interpreted by McInerny,
Veatch, and others, assumes a definition of “essence” or “substance” that is medieval,
and anachronistic. That is, in its traditional sense, Thomistic Natural Law cannot
withstand contemporary criticism, nor does it articulate in the appropriate analytic
language, a conception of essence that at all coheres with Descartes’ project and further
developments by Quine and Russell.64 Finnis subtly restructures Thomistic Natural Law
so that self-evident, incommensurable principles take the place of Aquinas’s conception
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of self-evidence (per se nota) and synderesis (“the law of our intellect insofar as it is a
habitus containing the precepts of natural law which are the principles of human acts.”)65
Finnis writes:
Aquinas asserts as plainly as possible that the first principles of natural
law, which specify the basic forms of good and evil and which can be
adequately grasped by anyone at the age of reason (and not just by
metaphysicians) are per se nota (self-evident) and indemonstrable. They
are not inferred from speculative principles. They are not inferred from
facts. They are not inferred from metaphysical propositions about human
nature, or about the nature of good and evil, or about the function of a
human being, nor are they inferred from a teleological conception of
nature or any other conception of nature. They are not inferred or derived
from anything.66
The type of self-evident principles that Finnis refers to are different, albeit subtly,
from the traditional Thomist understanding. As already mentioned, Aquinas believed in
an inherently rational structure by which man ascertains basic morality. Per se nota,
according to Aquinas, does not mean “self-evident” in the same way that Descartes, Kant,
Russell, Quine, and ultimately, Finnis use that term. Outside of the Treatise on Law, in
the De Veritate (“On Truth”), Aquinas describes his conception of self-evidence as
follows:
Just as there is a certain natural habitus of the soul whereby it knows the
principles of speculative science, which we call the understanding of the
65
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principles, so too in the soul is there a certain natural habitus of the first
principles of actions, which are the natural principles of natural law; and
this habitus pertains to synderesis and exists in no other power than
reason.67
Thomistic self-evidence, then, cannot be interpreted properly in light of the
typical, modern, rationalist understanding of self-evidence. Aquinas would not define
self-evidence in the narrow sense that modern philosophy, probably since Descartes, and
certainly since Kant has been accustomed to do. The Thomistic conception of selfevidence distinguishes between two different understandings: “intrinsic self-evidence and
self-evidence with regard to people.”68 Aquinas distinguishes between propositions
which are known by all, and propositions which require diligent study or a requisite
amount of wisdom: “Some propositions, however, are known only to the wise who
understand the meaning of the term….it is self-evident [per se notum] that an angel is not
circumscriptively in a place, but that is not manifest to the unlearned who cannot grasp
it.” Therefore, when Finnis and others attempt to interpret consistently per se nota as a
specific kind of Cartesian or Kantian “self-evidence,” they are failing to take into account
Aquinas’s looser use of per se nota.
The Thomistic understanding of the inherent rational structure of the cosmos
which leads to its eudaimonic and teleological ethic differs from the view of Finnis,
Boyle, and Grisez. The Kantian self-evident ethic that Finnis attempts to merge with
Thomism ignores the natural basis on which Thomistic Natural Law theory hinges. It
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would seem that any Natural Law theory would, as Russell Hittinger suggests, “require a
commitment to law as in some sense ‘natural,’ and nature as in some way normative.”69
The New Natural Law Theory Is Incompatible
New Natural Law Theory, in an effort to avoid the ostensible pitfall of the
naturalistic fallacy (in all of its various manifestations), asserts that moral claims cannot
be derived from “facts about human nature,” that moral claims can only derive from
“premises that include still more fundamental reasons for action.”70 The New Natural
Law theory abandons the central pursuit of Thomistic Natural Law theory—the
reconciliation of the natural world with human reason—a reconciliation achieved by the
apprehension of the inherent rational order of the cosmos.
Finally, New Natural Law theorists are arguably incorrect in asserting that
traditional Thomistic Natural Law theory has to be revised on the basis that it falls prey to
the naturalistic fallacy. Traditional Thomism does not allow for Finnis’s interpretation of
self-evidence that he formulates specifically to avoid any criticism related to the Humean
Is-Ought Problem. In addition, the revisions undertaken by Finnis, Grisez, and others,
although intriguing and perhaps enlightening in their own right, cannot pretend to
demonstrate the authentic Thomistic Natural Law legacy.
Conclusion: Traditional Thomism Requires No Revision
Traditional Thomists effectively counter the criticisms presented by both Hume’s
Is-Ought Problem and Moore’s Definist fallacy. McInerny delivers a rather scathing
indictment of the Is-Ought criticism of naturalistic ethics. He decries Hume’s assertion
as an egregious case of missing the point, in that it wrongly assumes an artificial
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disconnect between the “is” and the “ought.”71 This makes puzzling the New Natural
Law theorists’ suggestion that the Is-Ought problem provides too strong a disincentive to
traditional Natural Law theories. Scholars like John Finnis insist that Thomistic Natural
Law must, at the very least, undergo a re-articulation to achieve the respect of analytic
philosophy. Though this is an understandable position given the unfashionable and
perhaps difficult metaphysical claims that Thomism relies on, citing the naturalistic
fallacy as an ultima facie reason to do away with Thomistic Natural Law, traditionally
understood, is untenable.
The traditional Thomistic Natural Law legacy demonstrates that Thomistic
Natural Law, traditionally and properly understood, has much to offer contemporary
philosophy in its own right—independent of newer, similar theories. Thomistic Natural
Law requires only a proper interpretation to offer a valid message to analytic and
contemporary philosophy. Re-interpretations, like the New Natural Law theory, though
legitimate and rich theories in their own right detract from the profundity, accessibility
and expansive applicability of Thomistic Natural Law, authentically understood.
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